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Virginia Woolf's 
Double Discourse 
PAMELA L. CAUGHIE 
;;. 
If human beings were not divided into two biological sexes, there 
would probably be no need for literature. And if literature could truly 
say what the relations between the sexes are, we would doubtless not 
need much of it then either. 
BARBARA JOHNSON 
The Critical Difference (13) 
Written by a feminist (Virginia Woolf), for a bisexual (Vita Sackville-West), 
about an androgyne (Orlando), the novel Orlando would seem to be the 
quintessential feminist text. And that, indeed, is what it is in danger of 
becoming, just as Woolf is in danger of becoming the acclaimed Mother 
of Us All. In promoting Virginia Woolf's Orlando as a feminist work, 
feminist critics have picked the right text, but for the wrong reasons.! 
Orlando works as a feminist text not because of what it says about sexual 
identity but because of what it manages not to say; not because of what 
it reveals about the relation between the sexes but because of what it does 
to that relation; not because its protagonist is androgynous but because 
its discourse is duplicitous. With its eponymous character who changes 
from a man to a woman halfway through the novel, with its capricious 
narrator who at times speaks in the character of Orlando's male biographer 
and at others sounds suspiciously like Orlando's female author, this novel 
assumes what Jane Gallop calls a "double discourse." This double dis-
course is one that is oscillating and open, one that "asserts and then 
questions," "a text that alternately quotes and comments, exercises and 
critiques."2 By drawing on the Lacanian readings of Jane Gallop and Sho-
shana Felman, I want to offer a reading of Orlando that will explore its 
functioning as a feminist text and that will expose many feminist critics' 
appropriation of it. 
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Orlando is a biographical novel about a poet who lives and loves for 
over three centuries (and who is likely to live and love three more), chang-
ing from a man to a woman halfway through the novel, somewhere around 
the end of the seventeenth century. When discussing this novel, one must 
begin with this caution: anything you can say about Orlando can be used 
against you. For Orlando defies conclusions. The text of Orlando is as 
unstable as the sex of Orlando. The first words of the novel shake our 
certainty about anything in this text. We read, "He-for there could be 
no doubt of his sex ... ," and immediately our doubt is aroused. The 
emphasis on what should be obvious makes it seem unnatural. The em-
phasis on an innocent pronoun makes it suspect. This novel abounds in 
qualifications ("Change was incessant, and change perhaps would never 
cease"), paradoxes ("the [bllink] space is filled to repletion"), and contra-
dictions (the androgyne itself). This sexual and textual indeterminacy links 
language and identity. As the androgynous Orlando brings the question 
of sexual identity to the fore, the obtrusive narrator brings the textual 
language to the fore by intruding to discuss his own art (e.g., 65), to mock 
his own method (e.g., 266), and to characterize his own readers (73). 
Orlando is identified with writing throughout: she is read like a book (25); 
she concludes that she is "only in the process of fabrication" (175); and 
she writes at her poem through four centuries, borrowing indiscriminately 
from different literary ages, all the while questioning "What's an 'age,' 
indeed?" (205). 
This novel, then, is a text about writing, about constructing lives, his-
tories, identities, and fictions. Its desire is for expression itself, as Orlando 
says, for the fulfillment of desire "in whatever form it comes, and may 
there be more forms, and stranger" (294). This fulfillment of desire, this 
desire for expression, encourages us to read androgyny not in terms of 
some innate bisexuality but in terms of the situation of desire, the subject's 
situation in a signifying chain. One must assume a sexual identity in order 
to take one's place in language, in order to express anything. Sexual identity 
is assumed in language; it is, as Felman says, "conditioned by the func-
tioning of language."3 Woolf brings out the arbitrariness of that identity, 
the arbitrariness of language itself, through Orlando's switching from one 
sex to the other, and from one poetic language to another, as well as 
through the shifting of her own rhetoric in this novel. 
Just as Orlando's identity swings from the extreme of conventionality-
Orlando as a boy slicing at the swinging Moor's head-to the extreme of 
eccentricity-Orlando as a woman discovering she has three sons by an-
other woman-so the language of the text shifts from the transparent 
conventionality of cliches-to put it in a nutshell, by the skin of his teeth-
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to the opaque originality of Orlando and her lover Shel's cypher language-
Rattigan Glumphoboo. Just as the bombastic masque of the Three Sisters 
hyperbolizes Orlando's sex change, the self-conscious diction maximizes 
the language of the text, not just the self-conscious diction of Orlando's 
extravagant metaphors (he calls his lover a melon, a pineapple, an olive 
tree, a fox in the snow), but the self-conscious diction of the biographer's 
narrative as well (he describes Orlando's betrothed as fair, florid, and 
phlegmatic). Just as the sexual differences are put into confusion ("You're 
a woman, Shel!" "You're a man, Orlando!"), so are the extremes of rhet-
oric. For as Woolf reveals by mocking her own "Time Passes" section of 
To the Lighthouse, what is highly original in one context can, in another, 
be a tedious, grandiloquent way of saying simply "time passed" (Orlando 
97-98). What is conventional and wb.at is original, what is mainstream 
and what is marginal change, like Orlando's sex, with time and circum-
stance. We see that identity is as variable as language, language as vul-
nerable as identity. Woolf's rhetoric in Orlando is no more chaste than 
is her protagonist. 
What this novel expresses, then, is the difficulty of reaching conclusions 
about identity or language. Both are based on making distinctions, yet 
these distinctions are not fixed by reference to anything outside them. 
There is nothing "out there" to measure them against. What Woolf shares 
with a writer like Lacan is his verbal play meant to undercut his own 
position as the one presumed to know.4 What Woolf admires in and shares 
with writers like Browne, De Quincey, and Montaigne is their willingness 
to entertain a variety of opinions, their contentment to remain in uncer-
tainties, and their use of qualifying language to avoid "the rash assumptions 
of human ignorance" ("Montaigne," The Common Reader 64). And so, 
in Orlando, "we are now in the region of 'perhaps' and 'appears' " (102). 
To speak directly and with certainty on any matter is beyond the novelist 
Woolf as it is beyond the poet Orlando. Desperately seeking the irreducible 
linguistic episteme, Orlando discovers that one cannot simply say what 
one means and leave it: "So then he tried saying the grass is green and 
the sky is blue and so to propitiate the austere spirit of poetry .... 'The 
sky is blue,' he said, 'the grass is green.' Looking up, he saw that on the 
contrary, the sky is like the veils which a thousand Madonnas have let 
fall from their hair; and the grass fleets and darkens like a flight of girls 
fleeing the embraces of hairy satyrs from enchanted woods. 'Upon my 
word,' he said, ... 'I don't see that one's more true than another. Both 
are utterly false' " (101-2). 
As Orlando discovers, poetry and nature, language and identity, must 
be learned together.5 This is the point of the vacillating rhetoric and the 
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epicene protagonist of Woolf's novel. Orlando's identity, like her poem, 
is a palimpsest. It is "compounded of many humours," composed of "odds 
and ends," a "meeting-place of dissemblables" (73, 176). Orlando contin-
ually wavers between beliefs, changes or disguises her sex, moves in har-
mony with and at odds with the times. So too Woolf's novel offers support 
for differing positions without arguing for anyone. She writes: "Society 
is the most powerful concoction in the world and society has no existence 
whatsoever" (194); there is not much difference between the sexes, for 
Orlando remains "fundamentally the same" throughout, and the difference 
is "one of great profundity" (138, 188); "Clothes are but a symbol of 
something hid deep beneath," and clothes "wear us," changing "our view 
of the world and the world's yiew of us" (187-88). Such oscillations on 
the thematic and narrative levels of this novel are presented metaphorically 
in the recurring image of the perpetually swaying arras and in the alter-
nation of light and dark in Orlando's cab ride with Alexander Pope. It is 
in the midst of all these contrarieties, in the midst of such violent shifts 
in viewpoint, that Woolf offers her famous androgynous statement, not 
as a metaphysical or feminist theory, not as a resolution to or a synthesis 
of contrarieties, but as a way to remain suspended between opposed be-
liefs: "For here again we come to a dilemma. Different though the sexes 
are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation from one sex to 
the other takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep the male 
or female likeness, while underneath the sex is the very opposite of what 
it is above" (189). Androgyny embodies this oscillation between positions. 
It figures a basic ambiguity, not only a sexual ambiguity but a textual one 
as well. Androgyny is a refusal to choose.6 
And yet so many critics choose androgyny as the appropriate textual 
strategy or the appropriate sexual identity. In praising Woolf's Orlando 
for its presentation of transsexual ism and its theory of androgyny, most 
critics have tended to take Woolf's statements out of their context in this 
novel and to cite them as unambiguous truths about sexual identity or 
modernist-feminist novels. The androgynous Orlando is appropriated as 
a symbol of the more unified self, or as a resolution to the problem of 
true self and conventional self. "Androgynous wholeness" is the phrase 
Sandra Gilbert uses (119,127). Androgyny becomes a form of self-mastery, 
a metaphor for the autonomous self, a freedom from history, society, 
language. Yet such readings fail to grasp the concept of identity in Orlando 
because they fail to attend to its rhetoric. 
In Orlando, androgyny and transsexualism call into question not just 
conventional assumptions about sexuality, but, more important, conven-
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novel challenges the reference theory of meaning. In particular, it que:tions 
the notion that words get their meanings from things they refer to; the 
definition of words and categories by their essential traits; and the isolation 
of words and statements from their contexts of use in order to interpret 
them. The point of focusing on the marginal case (e.g., the transsexual) 
is to reveal the crucial decisions made in the application of a term or in 
the assumption of an identity. We can see this point most clearly in the 
famous clothes philosophy passage in Chapter Four, the passage often 
cited as Woolf's theory of androgyny. 
Now a woman and living in the eighteenth century, Orlando in this 
chapter is becoming acutely aware of her sex as she faces a legal challenge 
to her property rights, as she parries the advances of the ship's captain 
and the Archduke, and as she contends .. with "the coil of skirts about her 
legs" (153). Initially unchanged by the sex change, or so her biographer 
tells us, Orlando is now assuming a more feminine nature. Her biographer 
writes: "The change of clothes had, some philosophers will say, much to 
do with it. Vain trifles as they seem, ... they change our view of the world 
and the world's view of us" (187). According to this philosophy, our 
identity is as changeable as our apparel. Clothes make the man, or the 
woman. The difference between men, and between men and women, 
would seem to be a superficial one. However, the biographer continues: 
"That is the view of some philosophers and wise ones, but on the whole, 
we incline to another. The difference between the sexes is, happily, one 
of great profundity. Clothes are but the symbol of something hid deep 
beneath. It was a change in Orlando herself that dictated her choice of a 
woman's dress and a woman's sex" (188). That is, clothes don't make the 
woman, clothes mark the woman beneath. But again, the biographer con-
tinues, and two sentences later we find the famous androgyny passage 
cited above: "For here again, we come to a dilemma. Different though 
the sexes are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation from one 
sex to the other takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep the 
male or female likeness, while underneath the sex is the very opposite of 
what it is above," (189). 
Placed in its context, this paragraph not only contradicts the earlier 
assertion that Orlando's sex change had not affected his/her identity, and 
that other philosophy that says we put on our identity with our clothing, 
but it also contradicts itself. For the biographer begins by saying that 
clothes are a symbol of something deep beneath, that is, one's nature or 
identity, and ends by remarking that often what is deep beneath is the 
opposite of the clothing above. In other words, the passage asserts both 
that clothes are natural and fitting and that clothes are arbitrary and de-
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ceiving. Such a self-contradiction is not in the least surprising in this par-
ticular novel. What is surprising is that in appropriating this statement as 
Woolf's theory of androgyny, critics pass over the contradictions, ac-
cepting the statement at face value, taking the biographer at his word, 
which is to take his discourse for granted. 
If we consider this passage within its eighteenth-century context, we 
see that W 001£ is not arguing for one of two ontological theories-that 
is that identity is fixed or it is changeable, that sexual differences are 
n~tural or they are learned-but presenting two positions in eighteenth-
century thought which come out of a particular conception of language. 
On the one hand, we have Samuel Johnson's position: thought must be 
distinguished from rhetoric, the content from the form, the man from his 
attire. On the other hand, we nave Alexander Pope's position: the rhetoric 
makes the thought, the form and content are inseparable, the man must 
dress to advantage. On the one hand, clothes are vain trifles and rhetoric 
is superfluous; on the other hand, clothes are expressive and rhetoric is 
essential. 
But these apparently opposing views are grounded ~n the .same assu~p­
tions about language and identity. To speak of rhetorIc as either reveahng 
or concealing, to speak of appearance as either natural or contrived, is to 
set up a false opposition. It is to assume that we can get .beyond or ben~ath 
the linguistic paradigm, in which rhetori~al an.d s~xual d1fference.s ~~nctlOn. 
Such assumptions about language and 1dentity 1mply the poss1b1hty of a 
natural or naked state or status. Thus, when Sandra Gilbert offers us the 
choice of stripping away "costumes (and selves) to reveal the pure, sexless 
(or third-sexed) being behind gender and myth" (214-15), she a~sumes. a 
pure, free ontological essence which we can locate and define prIor t? 1tS 
insertion into language, society, culture. Proving the contrary 1S prec1sely 
the point of the vacillating rhetoric and epicene protagonist of Woolf's 
novel. 
In Orlando, clothing, identity, and rhetoric are not an ornamentation 
of something prior, but an orientation to something else. What matters 
is not what they mask or mark, but what they enable the protagonist or 
the writer to accomplish. That is, what matters is not the nature of the 
sign, the transsexual, but its position and function within a. particular 
discursive situation. And so, we must attend to the productlOn of the 
androgynous Orlando, not to her properties.7 If we return to tha~ clot~es 
philosophy passage, we see that in trying to distinguish the ways m wh1.ch 
Orlando has changed with the sex change and how Orlando embod1es 
traits of both sexes, the biographer ends up making stereotypical remarks, 
for he can make such sexual distinctions only by relying on conventional 
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assumptions about sexual difference. His only recourse, then, is to look 
at the particular case: "but here we leave the general question [of sexual 
difference] and note only the odd effect it had on the particular case of 
Orlando herself" (189). We, too, must attend to the particular case rather 
than the general category. What we need in order to read this novel is a 
conceptual model that enables us to discuss the androgyne not in terms 
of its relation to the self beneath or the world beyond, but in terms of 
the multiple and shifting relations among signifying systems, such as rhet-
oric, fashion, gender, and genre. 
Thus, we must attend not only to the various relations among changing 
historical periods and rhetorical styles, but also to the changing sexual 
metaphors as well. By employing three metaphors for sexual identity in 
Orlando-androgyny, transvestism, and. transsexualism-Woolf shows us 
that there are different ways of talking about identity, different kinds of 
appropriateness, different functions of language. When we fail to specify 
the kinds of distinctions we are relying on (as Sandra Gilbert does in 
equating these metaphors), our conclusions become suspect. Woolf knows 
all too well that any language she can use is already embroiled in certain 
conventional assumptions about gender and identity. Her solution, chang-
ing metaphors for sexual identity, is less a freedom from a gendered reality 
than a freedom from referential thinking. Such freedom comes about by 
a change in our conception of language. What is at issue here is a language 
that sets up opposing alternatives and one that plays out various relations. 
Such an epicene novel is possible when different functions of language are 
tested out rather than one being taken for granted. 
The androgyne, as Felman says, is "constituted in ambiguity" and there-
fore is not representative of any "single signified" (32). The androgyne 
threatens meaning by breaking down those oppositions that allow us to 
make meaningful distinctions. It calls attention to and calls into question 
one way of making meaning, the institution of representation. Androgyny 
is not a freedom from the tyranny of sex, as Maria DiBattista says, so 
much as a freedom from the tyranny of reference. The shifting and blurring 
of sexual identities, like the shifting and blurring of literary genres, periods, 
and styles, disrupts meaning brought about by fixed polarities, by defined 
standards, by rigid categories, by "rhetorical hierarchy" (Felman's phrase). 
Sex and text are rhetorical terms; they function not only according to 
certain grammatical and syntactical patternings and social norms but also 
rhetorically and historically. They are constructed according to a particular 
model of language. To put sexual identity and textual meaning into con-
fusion, as Woolf does in Orlando, is to disclose the dependence of sexual 
traits and literary standards on certain kinds of discourse. Because one 
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cannot locate innate sexual traits or essential literary values in the face of 
changing attitudes, conventions, and paradigms (whether scientific, literary, 
or psychological), one must continually posit and undermine, affirm and 
doubt, "yield and resist" (155). Oscillation is the rhythm of Orlando; 
oscillating exploration is its method. 
Far from defeating sexual difference, as many feminist critics claim, 
Orlando enacts it, enshrines it, exploits it, makes a spectacle of it, but as 
a playful oscillation not a stable opposition. The androgynous self in 
Orlando is a metaphor for the dramatic, the role-playing self. Androgyny 
is a metaphor for change, for openness, for a self-conscious acting out of 
intentions. It is not an ideal type, but a contextual response. Identity is 
always disguised in Orlando n<;>t because the "true self" is running around 
"incognito or incognita as the case might turn out to be" (168) but because 
identity is a series of roles. And successive roles subvert referential poles 
(Felman 31). In this sense, Orlando presents a Lacanian view of identity. 
Woolf no more than Lacan tries to define female identity, for any identity 
assumed finally, definitively, essentially will be constraining; any identity 
deemed authentic, appropriate, natural will be illusory. Yet Orlando does 
not transcend identity any more than Woolf advocates a gender-free real-
ity, as Sandra Gilbert asserts. For one cannot deny the reality of gender 
or the necessity of identity. "Identity," Gallop writes, "must be continually 
assumed and immediately called into question" (xii), just as expression 
must be exercised and at once critiqued. Divesting Orlando of property 
and patronym, putting her paternity and propriety into question, Woolf 
does not liberate her identity but refuses the categories by which it is 
fixed, determined, legalized. Orlando "compromises the coherence" of 
sexuality and textuality (see Felman 31). Its open-endedness, its openness 
to other literary texts, resists closure and containment, refuses to provide 
a conclusive and thus an exclusive statement.8 Orlando shows us how 
sexuality and textuality perform in the world; it does not tell us what they 
are or what they should be. What Woolf defies in this novel is any attempt 
to define writing or identity by definitive standards to which it conforms 
or from which it deviates. 
In her diary Woolf refers to Orlando as her "play side."9 It refuses to 
stop the play of speculation with a consistent argument or theory. The 
play side is concerned with writing as pleasure, not as production. As 
Woolf wrote in her typescript of "Professions for Women": "When people 
said to me what is the use of your trying to write? I could say truthfully, 
I write not for use, but for pleasure" (Pargiters 7). When Orlando admires 
the anonymous writers who built the house of literature, she means those 
writers who wrote with no practical purpose in mind, whether to protest 
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or to proselytize, but only out of the love of writing. For too long we 
have downplayed the play side of Virginia Woolf as displayed in such 
works as Orlando, A Room of One's Own, and Flush. We have turned 
her play side into a meaningful representation, into an alternative or an 
appropriate form. But as Ionesco once cautioned, any established form 
of expression can become a form of oppression, can become authoritative, 
can become, in Gallop's words, "a position and a possession." Orlando 
and Woolf neither reject past aesthetic standards nor prescribe new ones. 
They take from the literary past what is useful to them, use up standards, 
dispose of them, and thus expose them as provisional and changeable, 
disclose their dependence on certain contexts. Enacting a type of discourse 
rather than codifying one, as Woolf does in Orlando, exposes the supposed 
universality of aesthetic standards of v'llue. By questioning various meta-
physical positions, by testing out various narrative strategies, Woolf pro-
duces not "stable assumptions" but "contextual associations" (Gallop 64). 
She disrupts our tendency to see language as the transparent medium of 
communication; she defies our habit of looking through discourse to rep-
resentation. It is not that Orlando's playful surface has no point to it; its 
point is its playful surface. It is time this play side of Woolf's writing be 
accounted for in terms of different conceptions of self, language, and 
reality-in terms of a dramatic self not an appropriate one, in terms of a 
performative view of language not a cognitive one, in terms of a rhetorical 
reality not a referential one. 
It is not, then, that the appropriate identity is androgynous, but that 
the androgyne defies an appropriate, a definable, identity. Androgyny in 
Orlando is not so much a psychosexual category as a rhetorical strategy, 
less a condition than a motive. Androgyny does not substitute for anything; 
for that would be to fix it, possess it, universalize it. The androgyne defeats 
the norm, the universal, the stereotype that Woolf feared becoming, as 
she so often expresses in her diaries: "I will go on adventuring, changing, 
opening my mind and my eyes, refusing to be stamped and stereotyped" 
(A Writer's Diary 206). The stereotype, says Roland Barthes, is "the word 
repeated without any magic, any enthusiasm, as though it were natural, 
as though by some miracle this recurring word were adequate on each 
occasion for different reasons" (The Pleasure of the Text 42) or, I might 
add, on different occasions for the same reason. To continue with Barthes's 
terminology, the androgyne, unlike the stereotype or the norm, is neither 
consistent nor insistent; it is perverse. 
By taking the androgynous personality out of its context in this novel, 
by turning it into an alternative to or a substitute for the conventional 
character of the traditional novel or for the conventional self of patriarchal 
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society, so many feminist critics run the risk of reducing it to a platitude.1o 
They risk turning a text that works to undo norms, stereotypes, and stan-
dards into a new norm, what Gallop calls a "normalizing moralism" or 
"a comforting representation." The problem with the platitude, the norm, 
the stereotype is not that they are false or trite in themselves but tha~ they 
are false or trite in being detached from the contexts that gave nse to 
them. As Woolf shows in Orlando, what enables Alexander Pope's scath-
ing remark on the character of women (a remark so fa~ous that the 
narrator need not repeat it) to survive to shape future attitudes toward 
women is its being loosed from its generating context, which was this: 
Orlando inadvertently offended Mr. Pope by dropping a sugar cube "with 
a great plop" into his tea (214). A witty remark may be a. petty reto~. 
Unmoored from their contexts, literary standards, sexual traits, and SOCial 
values appear to be incontestable; yet they are responses to particular 
historical and rhetorical situations. Taking Woolf's statement about an-
drogyny out of its context in Orlando, repeating it as an una~biguous 
truth about human nature, trivializes it. What gives the concept ItS force 
are the contextual, textual, and sexual relationships in which it plays its 
part. "If you cannot give something up for something of like value," ~allop 
writes, "if you consider it non substitutable, then you don't possess It any 
more than it possesses you" (76). We need to look at what Woolf does 
in a particular text and context, not at what her writing represents for all 
times or for all women. 
Like Orlando herself, her critics must avoid the tyranny or folly of sex 
pride (160).11 They must avoid setting up a feminist referential in place 
of a masculinist one. They must resist reestablishing a natural, even nec-
essary, relation between self and narrative when they have exposed such 
a relation as arbitrary and provisional in conventional novels. 
What Orlando presents, then, is not a metaphysical theory but a play 
of forms. Woolf's androgynous vision affirms Gallop's "permanent alter-
nation " a persistent oscillation, as our binocular vision allows us to see 
both duck and rabbit in Wittgenstein's sample sketch (Philosophical In-
vestigations, II, section xi). The double discourse of Orlando enables 
Woolf to set up exchanges between opposing positions, between different 
orders of discourse.12 What appears to be an opposition between positions 
is tolerated as difference without belligerence, as different options on a 
spectrum of possibilities, not a choice of position but ~ doubli~~ of vision. 
The double discourse enables Woolf to present a bistable VlSlOn, not a 
univocal theory. This double discourse does not deny a feminist reading. 
As Gallop says, "This problem of dealing with difference without con-
stituting an opposition may just be what feminism is all about" (93). Woolf's 
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gesture in Orlando is much like Gallop's in The Daughter's Sedudion: 
she undercuts her own writing, or as Woolf puts it, mocks her own lyric 
vein (Writer's Diary 104); she changes her viewpoint; she alters her nar-
rative voice. The ironic, mocking tone, the vacillating narrative voice, and 
the pastiche of literary allusions in Orlando check our efforts to read for 
a personal argument, check our tendency to take Woolf at her word, 
which is to take her discourse for granted. The double discourse, in Fel-
man's terms its "play of undecidability," encourages us to suspend our 
analytical, judicial, end-seeking, purposive reading for the delight in spec-
ulation, equivocation, rhetoric, and play. Feminist readings of Orlando 
read only the law, or the counterlaw, of this novel, not its desire.13 They 
stress the purposive and polemical over the playful and pleasurable. They 
would suppress the very multiplicity aljd flexibility by means of which 
Woolf defies authority, systems that shut out (Writer's Diary 183), and 
"the desire to make others believe as [she] believes" (149). Orlando is 
feminist not in what its language says but in what its discourse achieves. 
Orlando gives us not a theory of androgyny but a performance. 
If androgyny were a triumph over the tyranny of sex (Maria DiBattista), 
a resolution to the contradictions between female and male (Rachel 
DuPlessis), or a transcendence of a gendered reality (Sandra Gilbert), then 
in writing Orlando Woolf would more than likely have defeated the need 
for literature, for sex cannot be separated from text, the grammatical from 
the gendered. Orlando's androgyny and diuturnity are not a testament to 
some essential and enduring human nature but an affirmation of adaptation 
and change and of the life-sustaining impulse to create fictions. The novel 
ends at the present moment, the moment of Woolf's writing ("Thursday, 
the eleventh of October, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-eight"), with 
Orlando's sighting of the wild goose: "It is the goose!" Orlando cried. 
"The wild goose ... " The wild goose and the ellipsis assure us that nothing 
is concluded, that the chase will continue. We can only respond, "Encore!" 
Notes 
1. Some feminist critics I'm referring to are Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Writing beyond 
the Ending: Narrative Strategies of Twentieth-Century Women Writers; Sandra 
M. Gilbert, "Costumes of the Mind: Transvestism as Metaphor in Modem 
Literature"; and Maria DiBattista, Virginia Woolfs Major Novels: The Fables 
of Anon. But the reading of Orlando and of androgyny that I take issue with 
throughout is a common one in Woolf and feminist criticism. 
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2. Jane Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis, 122, 
126. All references to Orlando are to the Harcourt Brace Jovanovich paperback 
edition. 
3. Shoshana Felman, "Rereading Femininity." I wrote this essay before reading 
Mary Jacobus's Reading Woman. In her introduction, Jacobus presents a read-
ing of Orlando that is similar to my own, drawing as I do on Felman's essay. 
4. See Jacqueline Rose's introduction to Lacan's Feminine Sexuality, 50. 
5. Thomas Kuhn writes that "nature and words are learned together" in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 191. In Chapter Two of Orlando, the nar-
rator remarks that the change in language and prose style in the seventeenth 
century is accompanied by a change in external conditions, such as in the 
natural landscape, in the character traits, and in the sewage system of London 
(113). 
6. To say androgyny is a refusal to choose is not to deny the possibility of choice. 
7. See Jacobus's first chapter, which contains a similar discussion of this novel in 
terms of language and clothing. See also Felman's "Rereading Femininity" in 
which she discusses sexual identity as "conditioned by the functioning of lan-
guage" (29). 
8. The narrator of Orlando often leads us to a big conclusion, and then omits 
it: "and so at last she reached her final conclusion, which was of the highest 
importance but which, as we have already much overpassed our limit of six 
lines, we must omit" (291). Other examples of this device can be found on 
pages 253 and 271. 
9. Woolf, A Writer's Diary, 134. In this entry (November 7,1928), Woolf com-
ments on one effect of this play side: "I rather think the upshot will be books 
that relieve other books; a variety of styles and subjects: for after all, that is 
my temperament, I think, to be very little persuaded of the truth of anything 
" 
10. This is a characteristic tendency not only of feminist readings of Orlando but 
of feminist readings of the androgyne in women's literature in general. See, 
for example, DuPlessis's Writing beyond the Ending. 
11. In "Women Novelists," Woolf writes: "any emphasis, either of pride or of 
shame, laid consciously upon the sex of a writer is not only irritating but 
superfluous .... a woman's writing is always feminine; it cannot help being 
feminine: the only difficulty lies in defining what we mean by feminine" (Women 
and Writing 70). Woolf's feminism, like Lacan's psychoanalysis, does not pro-
duce definitions but tries to account for how definitions are produced. See 
Rose's introduction to Feminine Sexuality, 57, and Jacobus's Reading Woman, 
20-21. 
12. The double discourse, like our binocular vision, gives us not just additional 
information but a different kind of information, a different way of organizing 
or processing what we experience. The shortsightedness of many feminist ap-
propriations of Orlando comes from incorporating its double discourse into 
a monostable vision, into the one-to-one correspondence model of the ref-
erence theory of meaning. Rather than representing a new concept of self and 
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narrative, Orlando presents a different way of conceiving of the variou~ rela-
tionships both within and between self and narrative. It does not represent a 
type; it enacts relations. (For a discussion of the binocular vision, see Gregory 
Bateson's Mind and Nature.) 
13. It is the Law that gives meaning to sexual difference. Orlando, though, is not 
answering the question of the meaning of sexuality; it is exploring, as Felman 
puts it, the complex relations between sexuality and meaning. See Shoshana 
Felman, Writing and Madness, 156. 
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